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*Comp. Law. 290 Following the enactment of the Insolvency Act 2000, directors' disqualification
proceedings can now be settled administratively by the offer and acceptance of undertakings. This
article examines the new regime and argues that, unless carefully implemented, it could undermine
the overall objectives of the Company Directors' Disqualification Act 1986. In particular, the hope is
expressed that the courts will not interpret the legislation as requiring the Secretary of State to accept
bare undertakings without any admissions by the director as to the underlying factual basis of
disqualification.
Introduction
Over the last decade, we have seen a huge expansion in the use of civil disqualification proceedings
under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA), so much so that disqualification of
directors is now one of the most significant parts of modern company law. In quantitative terms, the
Insolvency Service's response to the National Audit Office Report of October 1993 criticising its
effectiveness in implementing the CDDA1 has been impressive. There has been a dramatic increase
in the volume of civil disqualification proceedings brought under the core unfitness provisions in
CDDA, sections 6--8, with the result that the number of disqualification orders made by the courts at
the behest of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and the Official Receiver now runs well in
excess of 1,000 per annum. More specifically, according to figures taken from the Insolvency
Service's Annual Reports, 1,267 orders were made under CDDA, section 6, in 1997--98, rising to
1,548 orders in 2000--01. This represents an increase of over 20 per cent in four years and compares
strikingly with a figure of only 339 section 6 orders for 1992--93, the year immediately preceding the
publication of the original National Audit Office report.2 There will be those who say, with some
justification, that the real extent and effectiveness of this expansion in activity can only be judged by
comparing these figures with the numbers of formal insolvencies3 and the numbers of reports
identifying elements of unfit conduct received from insolvency practitioners or official receivers over
comparable periods.4 In relation to the latter, the most recent Insolvency Service Annual Report
discloses that the Service's Disqualification Unit received a little over 5,500 positive reports during
2000--01. On the crude assumption that the numbers of reports received and orders made under
CDDA, sections 6--7, were to remain constant over, say, the next five years, then taking into account
the time-lag between the commencement and conclusion of proceedings, the Disqualification Unit
would be taking successful action in between roughly 25 per cent and 30 per cent of all cases
reported to it. This may be too little for some. However, given the sheer numbers of directors now
being disqualified and the success rate of proceedings actually commenced (currently in the region of
95 per cent), it seems only fair to conclude that much has been achieved by the Disqualification Unit
in recent times.
Whether this increase in crude numbers of disqualified directors makes any qualitative difference to
the protection of creditors and the public is very much open to doubt.5 Nevertheless, it is clear that the
authorities have been pursuing and are continuing to pursue a policy aimed at maximising the
numbers of disqualifications while drawing as much public attention as possible to the regulatory
effort that is being expended against those who abuse limited liability. A cursory *Comp. Law. 291
study of DTI press releases from the last five years or so suggests that pursuit of this policy has been
accompanied by a sharpening of rhetoric.6 Moreover, there have been a number of high-profile cases.
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7 No doubt a cynic would say that the real purpose of all this activity is to create the impression that
the DTI and the Insolvency Service are taking effective regulatory action so as to inspire public
confidence. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the expansion in the use of the disqualification
regime in the period between 1993 and the present day represents a significant investment of political
will. In the process, the CDDA has grown from a cottage industry into a sizeable legal enterprise.
As well as being politically significant, this process of expansion has also been legally and culturally
significant. Civil disqualification proceedings are now the most visible means by which the law of
directors' obligations is enforced and shaped.8 This is especially true in relation to the common law
obligation requiring directors of companies of doubtful solvency to take account of the interests of
creditors when considering whether a course of action is in the company's interests. Furthermore,
disqualification proceedings are essentially a form of public interest litigation concerned in part with
the advancement of standards of commercial morality throughout the whole business community. The
courts have been keen to stress that the CDDA is not merely concerned with keeping errant directors
“off the road” and deterring them from misbehaving in the future. Through general deterrence,
disqualification also aims to encourage other directors to behave properly.9 It is therefore not
unreasonable to claim (as, in effect, the courts have done) that the now voluminous corpus of CDDA
case law serves as a source of general standards of governance for directors of struggling companies
and has created a modern discourse of commercial morality within company law.10
Although its impact on company law has been considerable, the CDDA has arguably become a victim
of its own success. For some time the pressure has been on to find new ways of pursuing and
achieving CDDA objectives while, in the same breath, reducing the substantial amount of court time
devoted to the hearing of formal disqualification proceedings. The outcome is a major reform brought
in by the Insolvency Act 2000 (IA 2000) that enables directors to be disqualified under CDDA,
sections 6 and 8, by administrative means without the involvement of the court. Under this “fasttrack”
system, which came into operation on April 2, 2001,11 the Secretary of State is empowered to accept
an undertaking equivalent in effect to a disqualification order in cases where the director consents to
being disqualified and the parties are able to reach agreement on the period of disqualification. The
purpose of this paper is to consider the policy driving the new undertakings regime and to examine
some of the problems that are surfacing during its infancy. The main point to emerge is that
“fast-track” disqualification by means of undertakings fits uneasily within the existing scheme of the
CDDA. Consequently, while the availability of “quickie” disqualification is bound to lead to further
increases in the numbers of disqualified directors coupled with savings in court time, these gains are
unlikely to be achieved without some dilution of the CDDA's deterrence and standard-setting
functions. It is therefore incumbent on the Secretary of State, as the effective regulator, to implement
the reforms with due regard to the overall legislative scheme and also incumbent on the courts, where
possible, to assist in this process. This point is developed by reference to the important decision of
Patten J. in Re Blackspur Group plc, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Eastaway, 12 the first
case to arise under the new regime.
The scheme of the CDDA
CDDA, section 1A (as inserted by IA 2000, section 6(2)), only permits the Secretary of State to accept
undertakings in cases brought under the core unfitness provisions.13 This part of the paper outlines
the basic scheme of the CDDA's unfitness provisions and so sets the scene for the discussion of the
new undertakings regime which follows.
CDDA, sections 6--9: the law relating to unfit conduct
Section 6 of the CDDA obliges the court14 to make a disqualification order against an individual if it is
satisfied that (a) he is or has been a director of a company which has at any time become insolvent15
and (b) his conduct as a director of that *Comp. Law. 292 company (either taken alone or taken
together with his conduct as a director of any other company or companies) makes him unfit to be
concerned in the management of a company. If the court makes a finding of unfitness it must
disqualify the director for at least two years but for no more than 15 years (CDDA, section 6(4)). Only
the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (or the Official Receiver, if the Secretary of State so
directs in the case of a director of a company which is in compulsory liquidation in England and
Wales) can apply for an order and then only if it appears to her that it is expedient in the public
interest that a disqualification order should be made (CDDA, section 7(1)).
There is a separate power of disqualification in CDDA, section 8. This permits the Secretary of State
to apply for a disqualification order against a person where information about that person's conduct in
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relation to a company has come to light in the course of the exercise of one or more of the statutory
powers of investigation specified in section 8(1) and (as is the case with section 6) if it appears to her
that it is expedient in the public interest that a disqualification order should be made. Under section
8(2), the court has a discretionary power to disqualify the defendant for up to 15 years where it is
satisfied that his conduct in relation to the company makes him unfit to be concerned in the
management of a company. In contrast to section 6, there is no requirement for the relevant company
to have become insolvent.
In determining whether the defendant is “unfit to be concerned in the management of a company”
under either section, CDDA, section 9, requires the court to have regard in particular to the matters
mentioned in Schedule 1 which include any misfeasance or breach of fiduciary duty by the director in
relation to the company, the extent of the director's responsibility for any failure by the company to
comply with certain specified provisions of the Companies Act and the extent of the director's
responsibility for the causes of the company becoming insolvent (which may or may not be relevant in
a section 8 case). The Schedule is non-exhaustive and so the court can take into account matters not
mentioned in it16 with the result that unfitness is a very broad concept. If proceedings are successful,
the court will make an order in the terms set out in CDDA, section 1 (as amended by IA 2000, section
5). Among other things, a disqualification order prohibits the disqualified person from acting as a
director or from being concerned in the management of a company for the period specified in the
order unless he has the leave of the court. There is also an absolute ban on the disqualified person
acting as an insolvency practitioner for the period of the order. A person who acts in breach of a
disqualification order commits a criminal offence (CDDA, section 13) and can be made personally
liable for the debts of any company in relation to which he acts in a prohibited capacity (CDDA,
section 15(1)(a)). Anyone involved in the management of a company who acts, or is willing to act, on
instructions given by a person whom he knows at that time to be the subject of a disqualification order
also exposes himself to personal liability for that company's debts (CDDA, section 15(1)(b)).
The purpose of the CDDA
As I suggested earlier, a major purpose of the CDDA is “to raise standards in the conduct and
responsibility of those who manage companies incorporated with the privilege of limited liability”.17 In
other words, it is concerned in some sense to protect the public through general deterrence. The idea
is that other directors will be influenced to behave in accordance with the standards that the
disqualified director has failed to attain. This view of the CDDA emerged in Re Grayan Building
Services Ltd ,18 where it was argued on the defendant's behalf that the court should assess the
question of unfitness at the date of trial rather than at the time of the relevant conduct. Reliance was
placed on the use of the present tense in the wording of section 6(1) (“that his conduct makes him
unfit”). Rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeal held that the use of the present tense “makes”
means only that the court has to make a decision on the evidence presently before it. If the evidence
of the director's past misconduct demonstrates unfitness, the court is obliged by section 6(1) to
disqualify him or her for at least a minimum of two years. This is the case even if the director can
demonstrate that in the intervening period he or she has been running other companies (not the
subject of proceedings) successfully and responsibly and so poses no threat to the public as at the
date of trial. As the CDDA obliges the court to disqualify a director in these circumstances, it follows
that Parliament must have intended disqualification to do more than simply protect the public from the
disqualified director. As Hoffmann L.J. put it:
“The purpose of making disqualification [under section 6] mandatory was to ensure that everyone
whose conduct had fallen below the appropriate standard was disqualified for at least two years,
whether in the individual case the court thought that this was necessary in the public interest or not.
Parliament has decided that it is occasionally necessary to disqualify a company director to
encourage the others.”
Henry L.J. added:
“The statutory corporate climate is stricter than it has ever been, and those enforcing it should reflect
the fact that Parliament has seen the need for higher standards.”
Subsequently, Lord Woolf M.R. confirmed in Re Westmid Packing Services Ltd that disqualification is
not simply concerned with keeping “bad” directors “off the road” but also seeks to protect the public in
a wider sense, by deterring the disqualified director and by encouraging other directors to behave
responsibly.19 If this wider function is to be carried out effectively, the process by which directors are
disqualified must be visible to the business community and the public so that everyone is clear as to
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the reasons for disqualification *Comp. Law. 293 and the standards of conduct that are expected.
Unless it is carefully implemented, the new undertakings regime could well reduce the visibility of
disqualification proceedings and accordingly undermine the operation of the CDDA.
Disqualification undertakings: origins and purpose
The law on undertakings pre-Insolvency Act 2000
Broadly speaking, it was not possible before April 2, 2001 for the parties to settle a disqualification
case on the basis of an undertaking that the director would refrain from acting in any of the prohibited
capacities mentioned in CDDA, section 1, for an agreed period. In the leading case of Re Blackspur
Group plc, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Davies (“Blackspur-Davies ”),20 the Court of
Appeal held that the Secretary of State's decision to continue disqualification proceedings against the
defendant, despite his undertaking not to act as a director or in any other prohibited capacity, was not
open to review. In the court's opinion, it was reasonable for the Secretary of State to refuse an offer of
undertakings on the following grounds:
(1) Once proceedings had been commenced, it was for the court and not the parties to decide
whether or not a disqualification order should be made. Under CDDA, sections 6(1) and 8(2), the
court could only make a disqualification order if it was “satisfied” that the director's conduct made him
unfit. As the statute required the court to be “satisfied” of the director's unfitness, the judge could not
be asked to make a disqualification order by consent of the parties without first forming some view of
the underlying merits.21
(2) The means by which protection of the public was to be achieved was embodied in a detailed
legislative scheme that did not expressly provide for the disposal of proceedings on the basis of
undertakings without any admission as to the factual basis of disqualification. The Secretary of State
was therefore entitled to adhere to the statutory scheme in the interests of good regulation.
(3) The undertakings offered by the defendant did not provide the public with the same level of
protection as that afforded by a disqualification order even though they were expressed to be
permanent in duration. Disqualification undertakings were inferior in three respects. First, breach of
an undertaking, as opposed to an order, would not trigger the enforcement provisions in CDDA,
sections 13-15 (which, among other things, impose personal liability on the disqualified person for the
debts of relevant companies and accessory liability on third parties). Secondly, there was no statutory
procedure governing the grant of leave to act in a prohibited capacity where undertakings had been
given. Finally, there was no scope for undertakings to be publicised by means of an entry in the
register of disqualification orders maintained by the Secretary of State under CDDA, section 18(2).
In Blackspur-Davies , the Court of Appeal did not go as far as to rule that the acceptance of
undertakings would be ultra vires the CDDA in all cases. Thus, it was possible for the court, with the
agreement of the Secretary of State, to stay proceedings on undertakings without formally disposing
of them.22 Equally, it was open to the Secretary of State to discontinue proceedings where
undertakings had been offered if she formed the view that it was no longer in the public interest to
proceed to trial. However, for the reasons given above, the Secretary of State was generally entitled
to decline an offer of undertakings with the result that an application by the defendant for a stay on
the ground that she was acting unreasonably in continuing the proceedings could easily be resisted.
The prevailing view, epitomised by the decision in Blackspur-Davies , was that some form of
legislative intervention would be required before the parties could dispose of cases on undertakings
as a matter of routine.
Carecraft disposals
Despite the position in relation to undertakings, it was possible under the pre-IA 2000 law for civil
disqualification proceedings to be disposed of on a summary basis using a procedure sanctioned by
Ferris J. in Re Carecraft Construction Co. Ltd 23 and approved by the Court of Appeal in Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry v. Rogers. 24 Under the Carecraft procedure, the parties can put a
statement of agreed or noncontested facts before the court and invite the court to make a
disqualification order for an agreed period or a period falling within an agreed range. The court is then
asked to make findings and dispose of the matter without the necessity of a full trial. It is the essence
of Carecraft that the court is not strictly bound by the agreement reached by the parties. Strictly
speaking, the court must make its own findings based on the Carecraft statement.25 In theory, the
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court could hold that the conduct described in the Carecraft statement is of insufficient gravity to merit
a finding of unfitness. Alternatively, the court might be satisfied that the agreed conduct makes the
director unfit but disagree with the parties' assessment of the appropriate period of disqualification. If
the court disagrees with the parties on either question, the case is adjourned to a full hearing with
both sides able to adduce evidence in the normal way. The Carecraft procedure has proved
something of a success and is used widely in CDDA, section 6 cases.26 Although, in practice,
Carecraft is something of a rubber-stamping exercise, the court is the ultimate arbiter and a summary
disposal results in the making of a disqualification order. Thus, the objections raised in the
Blackspur-Davies case could not be levelled at this method of compromising proceedings.
*Comp. Law. 294 Calls for reform
Despite the relative success of Carecraft , support grew in the second half of the 1990s for the idea
that the CDDA should be amended to enable the Secretary of State to settle disqualification cases in
a way that achieved the same legal effect as a disqualification order without the court having to hear
the matter at all, even on a summary basis. The first public call for reform was made by the then
Vice-Chancellor, Sir Richard Scott, in December 1995. In a Practice Direction27 aimed in part at
streamlining Carecraft , he made the following recommendation:
“Under the 1986 Act, there is no alternative but for all applications for disqualification orders, no
matter what state of agreement there may be between the parties, to be processed through the court
machinery and made by a judge or registrar after a court hearing. I regard this as unnecessary and
avoidable. I would recommend, accordingly, that the Secretary of State give consideration to the
possibility of introducing amending legislation, under which an agreement between a director and the
Secretary of State, or the Official Receiver, as to the disqualification period to be applied to the
director, be given the same effect as a court order imposing the disqualification period. If the director
is willing to bar himself from acting as a director for a period that the Secretary of State, or Official
Receiver regards as being sufficient to protect the public interest, I do not see why time and money
should be expended by insistence on bringing the case before the court.”
Similar judicial recommendations were made in the course of subsequent Carecraft cases28 and were
echoed by the Court of Appeal in Blackspur. 29 There can be little doubt that this growth in judicial
support for a statutory system of undertakings was a reflection of the increasing pressure that
disqualification cases were bringing to bear on court resources. In particular, there was a strong
feeling that Carecraft was little more than a rubber-stamping exercise that did not merit the amount of
court time devoted to it. The government's response to these calls for reform is enshrined in section 6
of the IA 2000. The undertakings regime introduced by this provision is now considered in detail.
The new undertakings regime
Policy
It is clear from the available parliamentary materials that the government aims to increase still further
the raw numbers of persons being disqualified while, at the same time, reducing the amount of public
expenditure and court time devoted to disqualification proceedings. It was suggested during the
parliamentary debate that undertakings will save the DTI an estimated £300,000 per annum.30
Although there was praise for Carecraft , it was felt that the procedure still involved unnecessary costs
such as the costs of negotiating the statement of agreed facts and attending court.31 The
government's key objective is to reduce the time the courts spend dealing with the 90 per cent of
cases in which proceedings are commenced but do not proceed to trial.32 As we will see below, the
Secretary of State is able to accept undertakings and dispose of cases even before formal
proceedings are commenced. Cases dealt with in this way will be taken out of the court system
altogether. In the process, disqualification proceedings will be brought much more into line with
ordinary civil proceedings.33 It is also claimed that the undertakings regime will improve regulation by
enabling more directors to be processed through the system more quickly, thus providing earlier
protection for the public.34
Scope35
The main features of the new regime are as follows:
(1) A disqualification case against a person can be compromised by the Secretary of State accepting
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a bare undertaking in terms that, for a period specified in the undertaking, that person (a) will not be a
director of a company, act as receiver of a company's property or in any way, whether directly or
indirectly, be concerned or take part in the promotion, formation or management of a company unless
(in each case) he has the leave of the court, and (b) will not act as an insolvency practitioner (CDDA,
section 1A).
(2) The decision to accept an undertaking is exclusively a matter within the Secretary of State's
administrative discretion. Hitherto, the Secretary of State's discretion has been merely prosecutorial.
Disqualification proceedings can only be commenced “if it appears to the Secretary of State that it is
expedient in the public interest that a disqualification order should be made” (CDDA, sections 7(1)
and 8(1)). Under the new regime, the Secretary of State enjoys a wider discretion. Before an
undertaking can be accepted, two criteria must be applied. First, the Secretary of State must assess
whether the conditions in CDDA, sections 6(1) or 8(1) (as appropriate), are satisfied, i.e. it must
appear to the Secretary of State from the material available that the director's conduct makes him
unfit. It follows that the question of “unfitness” is no longer exclusively a matter for the court.
Secondly, the Secretary of State must consider that it is expedient in the public interest to accept an
undertaking instead of apply *Comp. Law. 295 ing, or proceeding with an application, for a
disqualification order (CDDA, sections 7(2A) and 8(2A)). Subject to the agreement of the parties, the
upshot is that a director can be disqualified exclusively by administrative means. It is clear that the
Secretary of State's decision to refuse an undertaking and press on with proceedings is susceptible to
judicial review in the normal way.36 In cases where undertakings are accepted, the court has power
under CDDA, section 8A, to vary an undertaking by reducing the period for which it is to be in force or
to discharge an undertaking altogether. By ensuring that the matter can still be reviewed by an
impartial tribunal independent of the Secretary of State, section 8A amounts to a guarantee of the
disqualified person's due process rights under Article 6 of the ECHR.
(3) It is clear from the wording of CDDA, sections 7(2A) and 8(2A), that the Secretary of State can
accept undertakings either before or after proceedings are initiated. It is unlikely that the Secretary of
State will consider an offer of undertakings before the point at which she would ordinarily decide to
bring proceedings. This is because she is required by CDDA, sections 7(2A) and 8(2A), to form a
view on the merits.37
(4) An undertaking has exactly the same legal effect as a disqualification order.38
Current practice and emerging problems
As the Secretary of State is required by the legislation to consider whether a director is unfit before
accepting an undertaking, the Disqualification Unit continues to follow all of its usual pre-action
procedures and puts together its basic case. The decision is then taken on whether to commence
proceedings. The Secretary of State is obliged by CDDA, section 16(1), to give not less than 10 days'
notice of her intention to apply for a disqualification order.39 Her current practice is to send the director
a letter before action containing a brief statement of the unfit conduct on which she proposes to rely
and an indication of the period of disqualification that she considers would be appropriate. The
director is also advised in the letter before action that it is possible for him to compromise the matter
by offering a disqualification undertaking, which if accepted, would have the same effect as a
disqualification order. The Disqualification Unit has revised its procedures to ensure that there is time
between the sending out of the letter before action and the commencement of proceedings for the
parties to consider a settlement.
The main problem to emerge thus far concerns the contents of a disqualification undertaking. In
contrast to the position under the Carecraft procedure, it is clear that the parties are not formally
required by the new legislation to negotiate and agree a statement of unfit conduct. The Secretary of
State clearly has the power to accept a bare undertaking simply recording, in the terms of CDDA,
section 1A, that for a specified period the person giving the undertaking will not act as a director etc.
without the court's leave nor as an insolvency practitioner. However, in practice, the Secretary of
State will only accept an undertaking where the director is prepared to admit (or, at least, not dispute)
the factual basis of the disqualification, short details of which are then recorded in a schedule
annexed to the undertaking. Within days of the undertakings regime coming into force, this practice
was challenged in Re Blackspur Group plc, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Eastaway (“
Blackspur-Eastaway ”).40 Having previously failed in various attempts to halt the proceedings against
him, including an application to have the case dismissed on grounds that its prosecution infringed his
rights under ECHR, Article 6,41 Mr Eastaway indicated that he wished to take advantage of the new
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law by offering a disqualification undertaking. However, he was not prepared to give a disqualification
undertaking in the form required by the Secretary of State. In particular, he was unwilling to agree that
a schedule of unfit conduct should be annexed to or form part of the undertaking fearing stigma and
the impact that any admissions might have on his career as an accountant. The question for the court
was whether the proceedings should be stayed or dismissed on the ground that the Secretary of
State was acting unreasonably in refusing to accept the bare undertaking on offer. The application
was argued on the basis that the Secretary of State would only be acting unreasonably if the
applicant could establish that the practice of requiring a schedule of unfit conduct containing
admissions of fact was ultra vires and unlawful. The applicant's case was that CDDA, section 1A,
empowered the Secretary of State to accept only a bare undertaking without any admission of liability,
the object being to eliminate the need for and costs of court proceedings. There was nothing in the
amended legislation giving the Secretary of State power to insist that a director agree to a schedule of
unfit conduct before an undertaking could be accepted nor had any such requirement been imposed
in regulations made under the rule-making power in CDDA, section 21(2). In a decision currently the
subject of a pending appeal, Patten J. rejected Mr Eastaway's application holding that the Act confers
a discretion on the Secretary of State to seek and obtain the director's agreement to a sched *Comp.
Law. 296 ule of unfit conduct in an appropriate case. The judge's grounds for reaching this
conclusion were as follows:
(1) The Secretary of State must as a pre-condition to the acceptance of a disqualification undertaking
form the view on the evidence that the conduct of the relevant director makes him unfit so as to justify
disqualification. Although this is not a judicial process as such, it does require the Secretary of State
to exercise a judgment and to form a conclusion on the material before her. It would be odd if
Parliament, while requiring the Secretary of State to perform that exercise in order to be able to
accept the undertaking, nevertheless intended that she should have no power either to agree and
accept a statement of the grounds upon which she concluded that unfitness had been made out or in
appropriate cases to insist upon such a statement before being prepared to accept the undertaking.
(2) The factual basis for the making of disqualification orders (including orders made under the
Carecraft procedure) ensures the deterrent effect of such orders and thereby the protection of the
public against those unfit to assume the role of directors. There is nothing in the CDDA as amended
to suggest that Parliament did not intend that disqualification undertakings should have the same
effect. Indeed, if the purpose of the amended legislation is to enable directors to give disqualification
undertakings without any admission of liability, it is difficult to see why it requires the Secretary of
State to be satisfied that a case of unfitness has been made out.
(3) A knowledge and understanding of the grounds upon which an undertaking was accepted is
relevant in the determination of any subsequent application for leave to act as a director under CDDA,
section 17, or for the variation or discharge of the undertaking under CDDA, section 8A. If the
Secretary of State is able to agree a statement of grounds then this benefits both parties as the basis
for disqualification is clearly defined and neither party will be required or be able to contest those
matters on such an application. Parliament cannot have intended that in the case of disqualification
undertakings the court could be required to decide contested issues of fitness years after the event
merely for the purpose of determining whether, for example, the director in question should now be
allowed to return to business.
(4) The lack of any detailed regulations made under the rulemaking power in CDDA, section 21,
prescribing the form that an undertaking should take and requiring the parties to agree a schedule of
unfit conduct was also immaterial. If, as Mr Eastaway contended, the Secretary of State had no power
under the primary legislation to accept undertakings coupled with an agreed statement of grounds, it
was difficult to see how such a power could be conferred by means of delegated legislation.
In the writer's view, Patten J.'s reasoning is compelling on both philosophical and practical grounds
and should be supported on the forthcoming appeal. For reasons of efficiency, the amended
legislation provides a means by which disqualification proceedings can be compromised without the
need (as is the case with the Carecraft procedure) for the court to make findings. In this sense, it
brings disqualification proceedings into line with ordinary civil litigation within the sphere of private
law. However, this does not alter the fact that, both in form and substance, disqualification
proceedings are brought in the public interest and so raise concerns about publicity and transparent
dealing. As we saw earlier, disqualification of directors is justified on a rationale of public protection
(including protection through general deterrence) and, as Patten J. rightly emphasised, the Secretary
of State is required, in deciding whether to accept an undertaking, to consider this public interest. In
keeping with that rationale, there is a compelling case for saying that, in the absence of exceptional
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circumstances, details of the conduct forming the basis for disqualification should be a matter of
public record. Disqualification orders and undertakings differ in terms of public accessibility. An order
is made on the basis of a judgment given in open court. The reasons for the disqualification are
readily accessible. Similarly, in Carecraft cases, a judgment is given and it is standard practice for the
agreed statement of facts to be annexed to the order.42 In the absence of an agreed schedule of unfit
conduct that could be publicised by means of press release, the factual basis of a disqualification
undertaking is not obviously within the public domain. If the Court of Appeal rules that the only course
open to the Secretary of State is to accept bare undertakings without any admission of liability, the
scheme of the CDDA will accordingly be undermined. It would be tantamount to saying that the public
interest in efficient disposal of disqualification cases outweighs the public interest in the process of
disqualification itself.43 Finally, on the philosophical point, it seems clear that the amended legislation
was designed to meet the objections raised in the original Blackspur-Davies case. It was recognised
in that case that the factual basis for making orders, whether in contested proceedings or under
Carecraft, ensures that disqualification, based on findings or admissions of unfitness, protects the
public through deterrence. Indeed, the Court of Appeal's main reason for upholding the Secretary of
State's decision to press on with the proceedings was that undertakings without some admission of
liability did not offer the public the same degree of protection as a disqualification order. It surely
follows that Parliament must have intended that statutory undertakings provide equivalent protection,
including protection through deterrence. Any concerns that the director may have about the use of
admissions in other proceedings44 can be dealt with by the parties agreeing that admissions in a
schedule of unfit conduct are made solely for the purposes of the CDDA.45
Patten J.'s decision also makes abundant sense on practical grounds. The point that it is possible
within the scheme of the CDDA for a director disqualified by undertaking to make subsequent
applications either for leave to act while disqualified or for the variation or discharge of the
undertaking is a point well made. In those proceedings, the court will need to be given a clear idea as
to the factual basis of the disqualification. On an application for leave, the critical question is whether,
if leave is granted, the public will be adequately protected from the risk that the conduct that led to the
applicant's disqualification might recur. Clearly, in this respect, the nature and seriousness of the
applicant's previous *Comp. Law. 297 conduct is highly material.46 The same can be said for an
application under section 8A. Take, for example, a director who gives a bare undertaking for a period
of eight years but without making any admissions as to the underlying conduct. What if he
subsequently applies to vary the undertaking on the ground that an eight-year disqualification is
excessive? In formal disqualification proceedings (including those disposed of summarily under
Carecraft ) the question of the appropriate period of disqualification is a matter for the discretion of the
court47 to be determined in accordance with guidelines laid down by the Court of Appeal.48 In
exercising the discretion, the court is required to ensure that the period of disqualification reflects the
gravity of the misconduct. While there may be subtle differences between this judicial discretion and
the administrative discretion in CDDA, sections 7(2A) and 8(2A),49 the court could not review the
Secretary of State's decision to accept an undertaking in this type of case without making some
reference to the original misconduct. It is therefore in the interests of efficient regulation that the
parties agree and set out the factual basis of a disqualification undertaking. Otherwise, the court
would be obliged to reopen the question of the director's unfitness. This seems absurd and
self-defeating given that the whole idea of the undertakings regime is to allow the parties to settle
such questions once and for all without recourse to the court. There can be little argument either with
Patten J.'s conclusion on the secondary point concerning the rule-making power in CDDA, section
21(2). An alternative argument is that the CDDA as amended might be read as conferring a power on
the Secretary of State but one subject to detailed rules in regulations that have not as yet been made.
However, this point can be answered by reference to the Carecraft procedure which came about
without the need for detailed rule-making in regulations.
Finally, there is nothing in the parliamentary materials that contradicts Patten J.'s decision. The Trade
and Industry Select Committee formed the view that there could usefully be express legislative
provision for a statement of facts on which the undertaking was based so as to assist the court in
future proceedings.50 Concerns about lack of transparency and publicity were also aired.51 In the
government's view, there was a risk that the imposition of a mandatory requirement for an agreed
schedule of unfit conduct could delay disqualification and increase costs in cases where the parties
found difficulty in agreeing the schedule. However, the minister responsible did state that the normal
practice of the Secretary of State would be to seek agreement as to the factual basis for
disqualification before accepting an undertaking.52 Thus, the parliamentary materials reveal a concern
for flexibility that is consistent with the notion that the Secretary of State enjoys a discretion.
Page8
Conclusion
It is now theoretically possible for the Secretary of State to accept a disqualification undertaking from
a director who disputes some or all of the allegations of unfit conduct made against him. It is likely
that there will be considerable political pressure on the Insolvency Service to accept undertakings
without admissions so as to achieve the policy objective of disqualifying more directors at the same or
less cost. However, if the Secretary of State is forced to accept bare undertakings as a matter of
routine, the wider concerns of the CDDA will be undermined. The public interest in “quickie”
disqualification would come to outweigh all other considerations, including the public interest in the
promotion of good corporate governance. The Secretary of State's practice of refusing to accept an
undertaking unless the factual basis of the disqualification is agreed is consistent with the overall
scheme of the CDDA and strikes a proper balance between these different aspects of the public
interest. It is to be hoped that the Court of Appeal will uphold Patten J.'s decision in
Blackspur-Eastaway and give further guidance so that the undertakings regime can operate
successfully but in a manner consistent with the wider objectives of the legislation.
Adrian Walters Senior Lecturer, Nottingham Trent University and Solicitor. The assistance of
Malcolm Davis-White, 4 Stone Buildings, Lincoln's Inn, is gratefully acknowledged. The writer remains
solely responsible for the opinions expressed and any errors.
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